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THE IMPACT OF THE AMERICAN PIPE
DOCTRINE ON SECTION 13 OF THE
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INTRODUCTION
In light of the rampant, disingenuous practices revealed
within the financial industry over the past decade, the number of
securities class action lawsuits filed has significantly increased.1
Claims filed under Sections 11 and 12 of the Securities Act of
1933 most often take the form of class actions because of the
minimal incentive a single claimant has to bring a suit on his or
her own.2 The effects of these class action suits are severe and
threaten the stability of our economy.3 Because of the costs and
uncertainty associated with class action litigation of this
magnitude, it is in a defendant’s best interest to settle, and large
settlements are usually reached as a result.4
A class member may pursue a number of different paths to
maintain his or her rights. As a class member: (1) one may allow
the class action to represent his or her rights and be bound by
the judgment rendered in the class action suit;5 (2) before or after
†
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University School of Law; B.S., 2009, Indiana University-Bloomington. Thank you to
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Jordan Milev et al., United States: Recent Trends in Securities Class Action
Litigation:
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Mid-Year
Review,
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(May
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2013),
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/140610/Securities; see also U.S. CHAMBER
INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION LITIGATION: THE PROBLEM,
ITS IMPACT, AND THE PATH TO REFORM 5 (2008).
2
See U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, supra note 1, at 3.
3
Id. at 9.
4
Id. at 6–7.
5
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(3).
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class certification is determined, one may opt out and bring an
individual claim against the defendant;6 or (3) after class
certification has been denied, one may intervene so as to have his
or her perspectives on the matter heard.7 A class member that
opts out is no longer a member of that class and will not be bound
by any judgment or be entitled to any proceeds that may be
achieved in the class action.8
Section 13 of the Securities Act of 1933 (“1933 Act”) defines
two time limits for which claims pursuant to Sections 11 and 12
of the Act may be brought.9 The outermost limit prescribed is
three years from when a “security [is] bona fide offered to the
public, or [sold].”10 Different interpretations of Section 13’s effect
have caused a split among courts.11 The circumstances that have
caused inconsistent rulings are when a class action, alleging
claims under Section 11 or 12 of the 1933 Act, had been
commenced within the three-year period provided for in Section
13; however, while the class action is pending and after the
three-year repose period runs, a class member moves to
intervene or brings a separate, individual claim against the same
defendant. Should the court grant the motion to intervene or
permit the individual claim to be brought given that the action
was commenced more than three years from the offering or sale
of the security upon which the claim is based?
Courts are split as to the answer. Some courts have held
that the filing of a class action suspends the running of the threeyear statute of repose until class certification has been denied or
until a claimant opts out of the class.12 In contrast, other courts
have held that Section 13’s statute of repose is an absolute bar to

6

Id.
Id. at 23(d)(1)(B)(iii).
8
See, e.g., Mayfield v. Barr, 985 F.2d 1090, 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
9
15 U.S.C. § 77m (2006).
10
Id.
11
Compare Joseph v. Wiles, 223 F.3d 1155, 1168 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that
Section 13 allows tolling for individual claims while a potential class action is
awaiting certification), with Footbridge Ltd. Trust v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 770 F.
Supp. 2d 618, 627 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding that Section 13 does not allow tolling for
individual claims).
12
Joseph, 223 F.3d at 1168; Int’l Fund Mgmt. S.A. v. Citigroup Inc., 822 F.
Supp. 2d 368, 380–82 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); In re Morgan Stanley Mortg. Pass-Through
Certificates Litig., 810 F. Supp. 2d 650, 666–68 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
7
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actions brought more than three years from the start of the
repose period and that it may not be extended or suspended in
any way.13
This Note argues that the three-year statute of repose in
Section 13 of the 1933 Act runs uninterrupted from the bona fide
offering or sale of a security and operates as an absolute bar,
extinguishing claimants’ rights to bring an action after the threeyear period ends. Part I of this Note provides an overview of the
early legislation on which the 1933 Act is based and surveys the
events that led to the Act’s current form. Thereafter Part I
discusses four Supreme Court cases that courts are struggling to
apply consistently in the context of claims governed by Section
13. Part II identifies the significance of how the doctrine
established by the Supreme Court in American Pipe is
characterized and the range of consequences the different
classifications carry with respect to Section 13’s statute of repose.
Part II also analyzes the conflicting interpretations of the
doctrine articulated in American Pipe, which has led to the
current split among courts. Lastly, Part III argues that Section
13’s statute of repose is not susceptible to what has become
known as the American Pipe doctrine. Part III maintains that
regardless of whether or not the American Pipe doctrine is
recognized as a tolling doctrine, Section 13’s statute of repose
bars actions brought pursuant to Sections 11 and 12 that are
initiated more than three years after the bona fide offering or
sale of a security.
I.

THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS AND SUPREME COURT
PRECEDENT

This section provides a synopsis of the laws that helped
shape the Securities Act of 1933 and summarizes the Supreme
Court’s rulings that have influenced the split among courts. Part
I.A offers an overview of the early British and American laws
upon which our country’s current federal securities laws are
based. Part I.B then excerpts the relevant provision of the 1933
Act, as well as describes the events that led to the passage of the
1933 Act, the reasons for its enactment, and the noteworthy

13
In re Lehman Bros. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 800 F. Supp. 2d 477, 482–83
(S.D.N.Y. 2011); Footbridge Ltd. Trust, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 626–27.
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amendments made to it. Part I.C outlines the four Supreme
Court cases that have influenced the courts’ inconsistent rulings
regarding Section 13’s effect.
A.

British Legislation and the “Blue Sky” Laws

The framework for the federal securities laws took its
earliest form when Parliament passed the Companies Act in 1844
(“1844 Act”).14 At the time, the 1844 Act was the first modern
prospectus requirement enforced by a government body upon
The 1844 Act “introduced the principle of
corporations.15
mandatory disclosure through the registration of prospectuses
inviting subscriptions to corporate shares,” but it was not until
the Companies Act of 1867 that prospectus disclosures had to
conform with a detailed prescription.16 These laws held corporate
directors and promoters civilly liable for falsities in a
prospectus.17
Securities regulation in the United States first developed at
the state level.18 Although Massachusetts passed a statute in
1852 regulating the stock and bond issues within the railroad
industry,19 Kansas is credited with passing the first general
securities law in 1911, when the state implemented a
comprehensive licensing system.20 The Kansas statute required
14
1 LOUIS LOSS ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 2–3 (6th
ed. 2011).
15
Id.
16
Id. at 3.
17
Id. (holding actors civilly liable for “untrue statements in the prospectus
without proof of scienter”); see also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193
n.12 (1976) (Scienter denotes “a mental state embracing intent to deceive,
manipulate, or defraud.”).
18
1 LOUIS LOSS ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 48 (4th ed.
2006).
19
Id. at 48–49 (“ ‘No railroad company . . . shall begin to build its road until a
certificate shall have been filed . . . stating that all of the stock named in its charter
has been subscribed for by responsible parties, and that twenty per cent of the par
value of each and every share of the stock thereof has been actually paid into the
treasury of the company.’ ” (quoting 1852 Mass. Acts 208)).
20
Id. at 53 (That is where “the term blue sky law first came into general use to
describe legislation aimed at promoters who ‘would sell building lots in the blue sky
in fee simple.’ ”); id. at 53 n.20 (first alteration in original) (“[I]f said bank
commissioner finds that such articles of incorporation or association, charter,
constitution and by-laws, plan of business or proposed contract, contain any
provision that is unfair, unjust, inequitable or oppressive to any class of
contributors, or if he decides from his examination of its affairs that said investment
company . . . does not intend to do a fair and honest business . . . he shall notify such
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the registration of securities and securities salesmen, the filing of
semi-annual reports, bookkeeping standards—subject to
inspection, and standards for the denial of permits to sell
securities.21 Kansas’s model led to the passage of “blue sky” laws,
state implemented prospectus requirements, of one kind or
another in almost every state.22
B.

The Securities Act of 1933

In the wake of the 1929 stock market crash,23 Congress
established the first federal regulation of securities in the United
States when it passed the Securities Act of 1933.24 The bill was
drafted and signed into law after President Roosevelt wrote a
message to Congress calling for legislation requiring full
disclosure to the public of material information relevant to
securities to be sold.25 The 1933 Act, often termed “the truth-insecurities act,”26 became effective in May 1933 and put in place a
mandatory corporate disclosure system.27 In substance, the Act
provided for “the filing of a registration statement and the use of
investment company in writing of his findings, and it shall be unlawful for such
company to do any further business in this state.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
21
Id. at 53.
22
Id. at 54.
23
See id. at 255.
24
See id. at 256–57.
25
Id. at 255–56.
I recommend to the Congress legislation for Federal supervision of
traffic in investment securities in interstate commerce.
In spite of many State statutes the public in the past has sustained
severe losses through practices neither ethical nor honest on the part of
many persons and corporations selling securities.
. . . [T]he Federal Government cannot and should not take any action
which might be construed as approving or guaranteeing that newly issued
securities are sound . . . . There is, however, an obligation upon us to insist
that every issue of new securities to be sold in interstate commerce shall be
accompanied by full publicity and information, and that no essentially
important element attending the issue shall be concealed from the buying
public.
....
The purpose of the legislation I suggest is to protect the public with the
least possible interference to honest business.
Id. at 266–67 (quoting President Roosevelt, Message to Congress (Mar. 29, 1933)).
26
Id. at 268.
27
See id. at 269. “The term mandatory corporate disclosure system refers to the
information firms must disseminate when issuing new securities under the
Securities Act of 1933.” Id. at 269 n.21 (alteration in original).
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a prospectus in connection with the public offering of securities,
and subjected the issuer and those connected with the offering to
civil and criminal liabilities in the event of material
misstatements or omissions.”28
In 1934, Congress made two significant modifications to the
1933 Act. First, it reduced the repose period for Section 13’s
statute of repose from ten years to three years.29 Second,
Congress established the Securities and Exchange Commission
(“SEC”)30 and charged it with the responsibility to: (1) “interpret
federal securities laws”; (2) “issue new rules and amend existing
rules”; (3) “oversee the inspection of securities firms, brokers,
investment advisers, and ratings agencies”; (4) “oversee private
regulatory organizations in the securities, accounting, and
auditing fields”; and (5) “coordinate U.S. securities regulation
with federal, state, and foreign authorities.”31
Section 13, entitled “Limitation of [A]ctions,” is a timing
provision that imposes a limitation on the time frame within
which a claim must be filed under Sections 11 and 12 of the Act.32
By enacting Section 13, lawmakers created a “two-tiered
limitations period—a one-year statute of limitations framed by a
three-year statute of repose.”33 Section 13 reads, as amended:
No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability created
under section [11] or [12(a)(2)] of this title unless brought
within one year after the discovery of the untrue statement or
the omission, or after such discovery should have been made by
the exercise of reasonable diligence, or, if the action is to enforce
a liability created under section [12(a)(1)] of this title, unless
brought within one year after the violation upon which it is
based. In no event shall any such action be brought to enforce a
liability created under section [11] or [12(a)(1)] of this title more

28

Id. at 262.
See 15 U.S.C. § 77m (2006).
30
15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
31
SEC, The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains
Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, http://www.sec.gov/about/
whatwedo.shtml (last modified Mar. 8, 2013).
32
15 U.S.C. § 77m. Sections 11 and 12 “impose civil liability for false
representations made in a registration statement, prospectus or oral communication
used in connection with the offer or sale of a security.” Footbridge Ltd. Trust v.
Countrywide Fin. Corp., 770 F. Supp. 2d 618, 622 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); see also
15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 77l (2006).
33
Footbridge, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 622–23 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 77m).
29
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than three years after the security was bona fide offered to the
public, or under section [12(a)(2)] of this title more than three
years after the sale.34

Statutes of limitations create an affirmative defense for
defendants when a plaintiff fails “to bring suit within a specified
period of time after his cause of action accrued, often subject to
tolling principles.”35 In contrast, statutes of repose “affect the
availability of the underlying right: That right is no longer
available on the expiration of the specified period of time.”36
Accordingly, statutes of limitations are procedural mechanisms
that limit the remedy available for causes of action.37
Dissimilarly, a statute of repose “creates a substantive right [for
defendants] to be free from liability after a legislativelydetermined period of time.”38
C.

The Supreme Court’s Influential Rulings

The differing interpretations and applications of the
following four cases have fueled the current debate about the
effect of Section 13’s statute of repose. The Supreme Court, in its
landmark decision in American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah,
established that the commencement of a class action tolls the
running of a relevant statute of limitations for class members
who intervene after class status is denied.39
The Court
subsequently broadened the applicability of American Pipe’s
doctrine, holding that the commencement of a class action tolls
the running of a statute of limitations for class members who opt
out of a class before or after class certification is determined.40
The Supreme Court also held in Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis &

34

15 U.S.C. § 77m.
Ma v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 597 F.3d 84, 88 n.4 (2d
Cir. 2010).
36
P. Stolz Family P’ship L.P. v. Daum, 355 F.3d 92, 102 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting
CALVIN W. CORMAN, LIMITATION OF ACTIONS § 1.1, 4–5 (1991)). For a further
discussion of the differences between statutes of limitations and statutes of repose
see infra Part III.B.2.
37
First United Methodist Church of Hyattsville v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 882 F.2d
862, 865 (4th Cir. 1989).
38
Id. at 866; see also P. Stolz, 355 F.3d at 102 (“Unlike a statute of limitations, a
statute of repose is not a limitation of a plaintiff’s remedy, but rather defines the
right involved in terms of the time allowed to bring suit.” (emphasis added)).
39
414 U.S. 538, 552–53 (1974).
40
Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 353–54 (1983); Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 181–82 (1974).
35
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Petigrow v. Gilbertson, however, that equitable tolling is
inconsistent with statutes of repose.41 Consequently, courts
struggle to consistently apply these decisions in situations where
a class action raising claims pursuant to Sections 11 and 12 is
commenced before the three-year statute of repose has run and a
class member later files an individual suit or intervenes after the
three-year repose period ends.
In January 1974, the Supreme Court in American Pipe
established a doctrine that in effect tolls a statute of
limitations.42 In American Pipe, the respondents moved to
intervene in an antitrust class action lawsuit to which they had
been unnamed purported class members after the named
plaintiff failed to obtain class certification.43
At the time
respondents moved to intervene, the one-year statute of
limitations period had extinguished.44 The Court held, in the
statute of limitations’ context, that “the commencement of the
original class suit tolls the running of the [relevant] statute [of
limitations] for all purported members of the class who make
timely motions to intervene after the court has found the suit
inappropriate for class action status.”45
Timely motions,
according to the Court, were those motions that were brought
within the tolled statute of limitations period.46 The Court
reasoned that “the rule most consistent with federal class action
procedure must be that the commencement of a class action
suspends the applicable statute of limitations as to all asserted
members of the class who would have been parties had the suit
been permitted to continue as a class action.”47
Within months of its decision in American Pipe, the Supreme
Court handed down two rulings extending the reach of its
recently recited doctrine. In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, the
Supreme Court stated that the doctrine described in American
Pipe permitted class members to opt out of a certified class and
bring their own individual suit even when the statute of
41

See 501 U.S. 350, 363 (1991), superseded by statute, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-1(a)
(2006), as recognized in Greenfield v. Shuck, 856 F. Supp. 705 (D. Mass. 1994)).
42
See generally Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 552–53 (ruling made in the context of an
antitrust suit).
43
Id. at 543–44.
44
Id. at 544.
45
Id. at 553.
46
See id. at 552–53.
47
Id. at 554.
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limitations has run out.48 The Court reasoned that its decision in
American Pipe “established that commencement of a class action
tolls the applicable statute of limitations as to all members of the
class.”49
Thereafter, in Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, the
Supreme Court further extended the American Pipe doctrine to
include tolling for putative class members who seek to file
independent actions before certification of a class is determined.50
The Court reasoned that the statute of limitations remains tolled
for all members of the putative class until class certification is
denied.51 The Court again based its reasoning on a broad reading
of the principle explained in American Pipe, that the filing of a
class action tolls the statute of limitations for all members of the
class.52 Furthermore, the Court explained that not permitting
tolling would give putative class members incentive to file
individual actions prior to the expiration of the limitations period
and that this would result in “a needless multiplicity of actions—
precisely the situation that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23
and the tolling rule of American Pipe were designed to avoid.”53
More recently in Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow
v. Gilberston (“Lampf”), the Supreme Court confirmed an integral
feature of statutes of repose.54
In Lampf, the plaintiffrespondents’ complaint alleged violations of Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5.55 Claims filed
pursuant to Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 “must be commenced
within one year after the discovery of the facts constituting the
violation and within three years after such violation.”56 The
plaintiff-respondents contended that both the one-year statute of
limitations period and the three-year statute of repose period
governing the Section 10(b) claims were subject to the doctrine of
equitable tolling.57 The Court, however, held that equitable
48

See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 176 n.13 (1974).
Id. (emphasis added).
50
See Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 353–54 (1983).
51
Id. at 354.
52
Id. at 350.
53
Id. at 351.
54
See Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Pettigrow v. Gilberston, 501 U.S. 350
(1991), superseded by statute, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-1(a) (2006), as recognized in
Greenfield v. Shuck, 856 F. Supp. 705 (D. Mass. 1994)).
55
Id. at 353.
56
Id. at 364.
57
Id. at 363.
49
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tolling principles did not apply to the three-year repose period.58
The Court reasoned that the purpose of the three-year limitation
is “clearly to serve as a cutoff,” and that the “equitable tolling
doctrine is fundamentally inconsistent with the 1-and-3-year
structure,”59 an identical structure to the one- to three-year
structure in Section 13 of the 1933 Act.
II. THE CONFLICTING INTERPRETATIONS OF AMERICAN PIPE AND
SECTION 13
This section begins by discussing the different
characterizations of the American Pipe doctrine and why the
label placed on the doctrine matters. Part II.B then surveys the
line of cases that have held the American Pipe doctrine to be
applicable to Section 13’s statute of repose and the rationale
behind the rulings. Part II.C reviews the line of cases that held
the American Pipe doctrine to be incompatible with Section 13’s
statute of repose and disallow any extension of the three-year
time limit prescribed.
A.

The Significance of How American Pipe Is Characterized

How the Supreme Court’s holdings are interpreted and
classified is central to analyzing the effect of Section 13’s statutes
of repose. The American Pipe doctrine has been characterized as:
(1) equitable tolling, (2) legal tolling, and (3) not a tolling doctrine
at all.60 A court’s adoption of one of these three theories
significantly impacts its determination of whether actions can be
brought, for any reason, after Section 13’s three-year repose
period has run.
Tolling is considered “legal,” or “statutory,” when a court’s
power to toll is provided for in an appropriate statutory source
and can properly be applied to the limitations period.61 An
58

Id.
Id. Furthermore, “ ‘the inclusion of the three-year period can have no
significance in this context other than to impose an outside limit.’ ” Id. (alteration in
original) (quoting Harold S. Bloomenthal, The Statute of Limitations and Rule 10b-5
Claims: A Study in Judicial Lassitude, 60 U. COLO. L. REV. 235, 288 (1989)).
60
Compare Footbridge Ltd. Trust v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 770 F. Supp. 2d
618, 624–25 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), with In re Morgan Stanley Mortg. Pass-Through
Certificates Litig., 810 F. Supp. 2d 650, 666–68 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), and Joseph v.
Wiles, 223 F.3d 1155, 1168 (10th Cir. 2000).
61
See In re Lehman Bros. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 800 F. Supp. 2d 477, 482
(S.D.N.Y. 2011).
59
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example of this form of tolling is found in the statutory provision
governing post-conviction review of judgments.62 The statute
explicitly states that the time during which a properly filed
application for state post-conviction or other collateral review is
pending “shall not be counted toward any period of limitation
under this subsection.”63
Tolling is “equitable” when a tolling doctrine is judicially
created and deemed appropriate due to equitable considerations
contemplated by the court.64 Equitable tolling is appropriate only
when it effectuates the policies underlying the statute and the
purposes underlying the limitations period.65 For example,
equitable tolling has been applied to toll a statute of limitations
in the Railway Labor Act while lengthy administrative
proceedings were pending.66
It is less clear, however, what impact the American Pipe
doctrine has on Section 13’s statute of repose when it is not
considered to be a tolling doctrine, but rather a mechanism
whereby the filing of a class action “effectively” commences an
action for all class members. Tolling is said to occur when, by
operation of law, plaintiffs are excused from commencing a suit
to enforce their rights within a prescribed time frame because of
some event that the law recognizes as sufficient to extend the
prescribed deadline.67 Since American Pipe held that the “filing
of a timely class action complaint commences the action for all
members of the class as subsequently determined” and pursuant
to Rule 23 a class action is “a truly representative suit,”68 class

62

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (2006).
Id.
64
See Footbridge, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 626.
65
Burnett v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 427–28 (1965); Albano v. Shea
Homes Ltd. P’ship, 634 F.3d 524, 537–38 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Arivella v. Lucent
Techs., Inc., 623 F. Supp. 2d 164, 177 (D. Mass. 2009)).
66
See, e.g., Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S.
342, 348–49 (1944).
67
Brief for W.R. Huff Asset Mgmt. Co. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners
at 4–5, Footbridge Ltd. Trust v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., No. 11–1158 (2d Cir. July 6,
2011) (describing the discovery rule as a classic example of tolling, as well as
statutes that relieve minors of their obligation to file suit until they reach the age of
majority and the federal habeas statutes that excuse state prisoners from filing for
habeas relief within the prescribed one-year deadlines while that prisoner sought an
alternative remedy in state court that might moot the habeas claim).
68
Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 550 (1974) (emphasis added).
63
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members need not be excused from commencing an individual
suit for their claims within the prescribed time limit because
they have already commenced suit by operation of law.
B.

Courts That Held American Pipe Permits Actions Beyond the
Three-Year Statute of Repose

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit is
the only appellate court to address the issue of whether the
three-year statute of repose in Section 13 of the 1933 Act is
subject to the American Pipe doctrine.69 In Joseph v. Wiles, the
court had to determine whether the plaintiff’s Section 11 claim
filed pursuant to the 1933 Act, which was filed almost three
months after the repose period ran out, was timely.70 The
plaintiff argued that either a class action complaint previously
filed in California state court or a class action complaint filed in
Colorado’s federal district court tolled the repose period for his
Section 11 claim.71 The defendants relied on the Supreme Court’s
holding in Lampf to argue that equitable tolling did not apply to
statutes of repose.72
The court held that the repose period for the plaintiffs’
Section 11 claim had not extinguished because the filing of the
federal class action complaint commenced an action that was
truly representative of the plaintiff.73 Therefore, the court
concluded, the plaintiff’s Section 11 claim was timely filed within
the tolled repose period.74 The court gave three reasons for its
conclusion. First, the court concluded that the type of tolling the
plaintiff sought was “legal rather than equitable in nature”
because the claimant had not filed a defective pleading during
the statutory period or been tricked into missing the filing
deadline by his adversary’s misconduct.75 The court reasoned
that legal tolling ensues any time an action is commenced and
class certification is pending.76 Second, the court reasoned that

69

See generally Joseph v. Wiles, 223 F.3d 1155 (10th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 1166.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id. at 1168.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 1166.
76
Id. at 1166–67 (“[T]olling [is] no longer appropriate after [the] court ruled
definitively to deny class certification.”). The court goes on to proffer that the
70

FINAL_DENBERG

2013]

12/11/2013 3:43 PM

AMERICAN PIPE AND SECURITIES ACT OF 1933

251

“[t]olling the limitations period for class members while class
certification is pending serves the purposes of Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governing class actions.”77 Rule
23 “encourages judicial economy by eliminating the need for
potential class members to file individual claims” and the
purpose of Rule 23 would be diminished if class members were
forced to file their own claims to ensure their ability to maintain
their rights.78 Third, the court reasoned that tolling the statute
of repose while class certification was pending did not
“compromise the purpose[] of statutes of . . . repose” because the
plaintiff had already been a party to an action against these
defendants since the class action was commenced. 79 The purpose
of statutes of repose, the court stated, is to “demarcate a period of
time within which a plaintiff must bring claims or else the
defendant’s liability is extinguished.”80
Since a truly
representative claim was commenced, as the Supreme Court
alluded to in dicta, the American Pipe doctrine “in a
sense . . . does not involve ‘tolling’ at all.”81
Two cases recently decided in the Southern District of New
York also held that the American Pipe doctrine applied to Section
13’s statute of repose and permitted individual claims to be
brought after the three-year repose period had run. In In re
Morgan Stanley, the court stated that “the applicability of the
American Pipe rule to [Section 13’s] statute of repose here hinges
on whether its tolling principle is equitable or legal in nature,”
and the court found “more persuasive the view . . . that American
Pipe . . . ‘is a species of legal tolling, in that it is derived from a
statutory source, in this case Rule 23.’ ”82 The court reasoned
that the American Pipe doctrine is based on the “ ‘notion that
Supreme Court addressed this particular type of tolling in American Pipe. Id. at
1167.
77
Id. at 1167.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id. at 1168.
81
See id. (explaining that this doctrine may not be “tolling” because the plaintiff
“has effectively been a party to an action against these defendants since” a class
action brought on his behalf was requested but not yet denied).
82
In re Morgan Stanley Mortg. Pass-Through Certificates Litig., 810 F. Supp.
2d 650, 667 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (quoting Arivella v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 623 F. Supp. 2d
164, 176 (D. Mass. 2009)); see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072, 2074(a) (2006) (describing the
Supreme Court’s power to promulgate procedural rules and the effectiveness of rules
absent contrary legislative action).
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class members are treated as parties to the class action’ and that,
‘[b]ecause members of the asserted class are treated for
limitations purposes as having instituted their own
actions . . . the limitations period does not run against them’ ”
until class certification is determined.83 The court also explained
that tolling Section 13’s statute of repose is consistent with Rule
23’s goals of efficiency and judicial economy, and therefore
“consonant with the legislative scheme.”84 The court expressed
that class members would be induced to file motions to secure
their claims because of the length of the certification process, the
risk of certification denial, and the fact that evidence of the
offensive conduct could take years to come to light.85
The court in International Fund Management S.A. v.
Citigroup Inc. also held that the American Pipe doctrine applied
to Section 13’s statute of repose.86 The court had to decide
whether the pendency of a class action that raised the same
claims the plaintiffs contended in their individual suits extended
Section 13’s repose period by way of the American Pipe doctrine.87
The court held that tolling was available with respect to the
statute of repose not only for the same reasons enumerated
above, but added that the plain language of the statute itself did
not bar the application of tolling.88 The court reasoned that
Section 13’s statute of repose and statute of limitations are
written in comparable language, and since the statute of
limitations is subject to the American Pipe doctrine, the statute
of repose shall be as well.89 Moreover, in dicta, the court insisted
that the statute of limitations in question in American Pipe “was
more emphatically absolute, providing that ‘any action to enforce
any cause of action [under the antitrust laws] shall be forever
barred unless commenced’ within the limitations period.”90

83
Morgan Stanley, 810 F. Supp. 2d at 667 (alterations in original) (quoting In re
Worldcom Sec. Litig., 496 F.3d 245, 255 (2d Cir. 2007)).
84
See id. at 668 (internal quotation marks omitted).
85
Id.
86
See Int’l Fund Mgmt. S.A. v. Citigroup Inc., 822 F. Supp. 2d 368, 380
(S.D.N.Y. 2011).
87
Id.
88
See id. at 380–81.
89
Id. at 381; see also 15 U.S.C § 77m (2006).
90
Int’l Fund Mgmt., 822 F. Supp. 2d at 381 (quoting 15 U.S.C. §§ 15b, 16(b)).

FINAL_DENBERG

2013]

12/11/2013 3:43 PM

AMERICAN PIPE AND SECURITIES ACT OF 1933

253

Therefore, the court reasoned that if American Pipe was applied
to a statutory time limitation that involved more forceful
language than Section 13, it should apply to Section 13 itself.91
C.

Court’s That Held American Pipe Has No Application Within
Section 13’s Statute of Repose

The United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York, however, has rendered inconsistent judgments on the
issue. The same court that found tolling appropriate in In Re
Morgan Stanley and International Fund has, on two occasions,
articulated different interpretations of Section 13 with respect to
American Pipe.92 In Footbridge Ltd. Trust v. Countrywide
Financial Corp., the plaintiffs sought to avoid the absolute effect
of the three-year statute of repose and argued that the repose
period was tolled pursuant to American Pipe.93 The court,
however, held that the “American Pipe tolling does not apply to
[Section 13’s] statute of repose.”94 The court announced two
reasons for its decision. First the application of American Pipe
violated the plain language of Section 13.95 The court stated that
“[g]iving the words ‘[i]n no event’ their ordinary meaning
precludes the application of American Pipe.”96 The second, and
more extensive, reason set forth by the court was that American
Pipe tolling is equitable tolling and statutes of repose are not
subject to equitable tolling doctrines.97 The court reasoned that
not only is “tolling . . . not [explicitly] provided for in the text of
the [1933] Act or any governing statute” but “[i]n fashioning the
tolling rule, the [American Pipe] Court [acknowledged that]
‘ . . . recognizing judicial power to toll statutes of limitation in
federal courts’ ” is not a new phenomenon.98 Furthermore, the

91

Id. at 381–82.
Compare In re Morgan Stanley Mortg. Pass-Through Certificates Litig., 810
F. Supp. 2d 650, 670 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), and Int’l Fund Mgmt., 822 F. Supp. 2d at 382,
with Footbridge Ltd. Trust v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 770 F. Supp. 2d 618, 620
(S.D.N.Y. 2011), and In re Lehman Bros. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 800 F. Supp. 2d 477,
482–83 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
93
Footbridge, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 624.
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C § 77m (2006)).
97
Id. at 624–26.
98
Id. at 626 (quoting Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 558 (1974)).
“American Pipe tolling is a judicially-created rule premised on ‘traditional equitable
92
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court identified that nowhere in American Pipe did the Supreme
Court read Rule 23’s text as explicitly creating a class action
tolling rule and therefore concluded that it must be an equitable
doctrine.99
Thereafter, the court in In re Lehman Brothers Securities
and ERISA Litigation found Footbridge persuasive and similarly
held that the statute of repose in Section 13 of the 1933 Act was
not tolled by the pendency of class actions.100
The court
concluded that American Pipe is an equitable tolling doctrine and
focused its analysis on the differences between statutes of
limitation and statutes of repose.101 The court noted that
American Pipe was a case about a statute of limitations, not a
statute of repose, and unlike statutes of repose, courts may toll
statutes of limitations in appropriate circumstances.102
III. SECTION 13’S STATUTE OF REPOSE BARS ALL ACTIONS
BROUGHT AFTER THE UNINTERRUPTED THREE-YEAR REPOSE
PERIOD RUNS
A definitive determination of the effect of Section 13’s statute
of repose is needed to alleviate the split among courts and the
uncertainty of perpetual claims that businesses face. Part III
explains why treating Section 13’s three-year statute of repose as
an absolute bar, not subject to any suspension by way of the
American Pipe doctrine, is the accurate interpretation of the
statute as it is written. Part III.A analyzes Section 13 under the
assumption that the American Pipe doctrine is a tolling doctrine.
Part III.B then analyzes Section 13 under the assumption that
the American Pipe doctrine is something other than a tolling
doctrine. Analyzing the American Pipe doctrine both as a tolling
doctrine and as something other than a tolling doctrine results in
the same conclusion: Section 13’s statute of repose cannot be
extended by application of the American Pipe doctrine.
considerations’ of fairness, judicial economy and needless multiplicity of lawsuits.”
Id. (quoting Albano v. Shea Homes Ltd. P’ship, 634 F.3d 524, 537 (9th Cir. 2011)).
99
See id.
100
In re Lehman Bros. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 800 F. Supp. 2d 477, 481 (S.D.N.Y.
2011).
101
See id. at 482.
102
Id. at 482–83. “That decision, however, spoke only of tolling statutes of
limitations—something courts may do in appropriate circumstances. When it comes
to statutes of repose, however, the relevant policies are those of Congress rather
than any that courts might think preferable.” Id. at 483.
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American Pipe’s Effect as a Tolling Doctrine upon Section
13’s Statute of Repose

This section confirms that if the doctrine announced by the
court in American Pipe is a tolling doctrine, it is a form of
equitable tolling and therefore inconsistent with Section 13’s
statute of repose. This section then explains that even if the
American Pipe doctrine is considered to be legal tolling, Section
13’s statute of repose bars claims brought after the uninterrupted
three-year repose period ends.
1.

If American Pipe Is a Form of Tolling, It Is Equitable and
Inconsistent with Section 13’s Statute of Repose

If considered to be a tolling doctrine at all, the American Pipe
doctrine is equitable and not legal tolling. The Supreme Court
itself has unequivocally referred to American Pipe’s doctrine as a
form of equitable tolling. There is no evidence more conclusive
than the Supreme Court’s characterization of its own creation.
For example, in Young v. United States, the Supreme Court cited
American Pipe for the proposition that limitations periods are
usually subject to equitable tolling unless tolling is inconsistent
with the text of the statute.103 And in Irwin v. Department of
Veterans Affairs, the Supreme Court cited American Pipe for the
assertion that the Supreme Court has allowed equitable tolling
in situations where defective pleadings are filed during the
statutory periods.104
In keeping with Supreme Court precedent, three federal
circuit courts—the Second, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits—have also
referenced American Pipe as an equitable tolling doctrine. For
example, in Veltri v. Building Services 32B-J Pension Fund, the
Second Circuit cited American Pipe as an example of equitable
tolling,105 and in Bridges v. Department of Maryland State Police,
the Fourth Circuit stated that the “American Pipe/Crown, Cork
& Seal equitable tolling rule is a limited exception.”106 Also, in
Youngblood v. Dalzell, the Sixth Circuit alluded to the plaintiff’s
failure to discuss whether the relevant limitations period was

103
104
105

Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43, 49 (2002).
Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990).
Veltri v. Bldg. Serv. 32B-J Pension Fund, 393 F.3d 318, 322–23 (2d Cir.

2004).
106

Bridges v. Dep’t of Md. State Police, 441 F.3d 197, 211 (4th Cir. 2006).
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subject to equitable tolling under American Pipe precedent.107
The Second Circuit has even explicitly referred to tolling based
on the pendency of a class action, exactly the situation that the
American Pipe court was confronted with, as equitable tolling.108
Furthermore, in American Pipe, the Supreme Court
acknowledged that it alone possessed the power to toll statutes of
limitations in federal court.109 In doing so, the Court declared
that the American Pipe doctrine was promulgated by way of its
discretion to do so and not as a result of an express grant
provided for in the statute.110 Therefore, the American Pipe
doctrine is effectuated by use of judicial power alone and not by
way of power conferred on the court by the text of a relevant
statute. Accordingly, it must be a form of equitable tolling.
Moreover, the American Pipe rule was premised on equitable
considerations of fairness and judicial economy.111 The Court
concluded that, although a federal statute provides for
substantive liability and defines a time period within which a
suit must be brought, the federal courts alone have the power to
toll in circumstances where tolling would not be inconsistent
with the legislative purpose.112 For the reasons stated above, if
the American Pipe rule is deemed a tolling doctrine, it is an
equitable one. Since equitable tolling principles are inconsistent
with the one- to three-year structure, the American Pipe doctrine
may not be validly applied to Section 13’s statute of repose.
2.

Even If American Pipe Is Considered Legal Tolling, It Does
Not Effect Section 13’s Statute of Repose

When Congress enacted the Rules Enabling Act, it granted
the Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules of procedure,
subject to congressional review.113 A federal rule, the Supreme
Court stated, is permissible if it regulates the judicial process for
enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law,114 but
107

Youngblood v. Dalzell, 925 F.2d 954, 959 n.3 (6th Cir. 1991).
See Casey v. Merck & Co., 653 F.3d 95, 97 (2d Cir. 2011).
109
Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 558 (1974).
110
See id. at 558–59.
111
See id. at 550–54; Albano v. Shea Homes Ltd. P’ship, 634 F.3d 524, 537–38
(9th Cir. 2011).
112
See Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 559.
113
28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2006).
114
Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 407
(2010) (plurality opinion) (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941)).
108
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it may not “change [a] plaintiffs’ separate entitlements to relief
nor abridge defendants’ rights.”115 The theory that the American
Pipe doctrine is a form of legal tolling rests on the notion that the
Supreme Court’s power to “toll” the statute of limitations in
American Pipe is derived from Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.116 By holding that pursuant to Rule 23 the
commencement of a class action tolls the running of an applicable
statute of limitations for class members, the Supreme Court is
believed to have promulgated the rule known as the American
Pipe doctrine from a statutory source, thereby making it a legal
tolling doctrine.
But even if the American Pipe doctrine is considered a form
of “legal tolling,” a statute of repose’s substantive character
precludes the American Pipe doctrine from applying to Section 13
because rules promulgated by the Supreme Court, such as the
American Pipe doctrine, cannot alter substantive rights granted
by Congress.
Since statutes of limitations operate as a
procedural mechanism and regulate the time at which an
affirmative defense to a claim may be raised, the Rules Enabling
Act permits tolling them.117 On the other hand, statutes of repose
grant a substantive right, which cannot be curtailed by a rule
promulgated by the Supreme Court, and tolling them pursuant to
the American Pipe doctrine is therefore prohibited.118 Congress
enacts a statute of repose with the intention that the time period
prescribed not be modified in the absence of further legislative
action.

115

Id. at 408; cf. id. (holding that a federal rule may not “alter[] [substantive]
rights themselves”); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b).
116
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(A).
117
P. Stolz Family P’ship L.P. v. Daum, 355 F.3d 92, 102–03 (2d Cir. 2004)
(holding that since a statute of limitation is procedural and a limit to plaintiff’s
remedy, it may be subject to “various forms of tolling” (quoting CORMAN, supra note
36)).
118
Id. (clarifying that statutes of repose cannot be tolled because they are
substantive and “affect the availability of the underlying right.” (quoting CORMAN,
supra note 36)); see Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2561 (2011)
(American Pipe tolling of statutes of repose would “ ‘abridge, enlarge or
modify . . . substantive right[s],’ ” which is exactly what the Rules Enabling Act
prohibits (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b))); see also Albano v. Shea Homes Ltd. P’ship,
254 P.3d 360, 366 (Ariz. 2011) (en banc) (concluding that American Pipe’s judicially
created tolling rule could not “alter the substantive effect of a statute of repose”).
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Principles of Statutory Interpretation Indicate That Section
13’s Statute of Repose Is an Absolute Bar

This section confirms Section 13’s absolute effect even under
the notion that the doctrine articulated by the Court in American
Pipe is something distinguishable from a tolling doctrine
altogether. Principles of statutory interpretation indicate that
Section 13’s statute of repose operates as an absolute bar to both
individual claims and motions to intervene brought more than
three years after the date the security in question is sold. An
analysis of the following demonstrates why the three-year limit
serves to extinguish claims once reached: (1) the statute’s plain
language; (2) the congressional intent behind enacting the
statutory provision; (3) the Security and Exchange Commission’s
own interpretation of the provision; and (4) the public policy
issues surrounding the debate.
1.

Section 13’s Plain Language Indicates That the Statute of
Repose Is an Absolute Bar and That There Are No
Exceptions

The American Pipe doctrine and the Court’s rationale for its
ruling are incompatible with Section 13’s statute of repose
because the application of that doctrine is unambiguously
prohibited by the express language of the provision and the rules
governing civil procedure. Analysis of Section 13’s text pursuant
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure supports the conclusion
that the American Pipe doctrine cannot modify the statute’s
three-year repose period. The Court in American Pipe held that
a timely class action complaint commences the action for all
members of the subsequently determined class.119
But the filing of a class action only commences that
particular action against the defendant for all class members, not
all actions that class members may subsequently bring. To
illustrate this point, consider the statute’s text under the two
situations that call into question the statute of repose’s absolute
nature: (1) when a class member seeks to bring a separate,
individual suit, and (2) when a class member seeks to intervene
in the class action. Section 13 states “[i]n no event shall any such
action be brought to enforce a liability . . . more than three years”

119

Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S 538, 550 (1974).
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after the bona fide offering or sale of a security.120 An action at
law is any judicial proceeding in which rights are determined.121
Therefore, since both an individual claim and motion to intervene
require judicial proceedings to determine the rights requested,
they constitute an action. An action is brought when the action
is commenced.122 To commence an action is to demand something
by institution of process in a court of justice.123 The reason for
which a particular action is brought is immaterial; the statute
says “[i]n no event shall any.”124
According to Rule 2 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(“FRCP”), “[t]here is one form of action—the civil action.”125 Rule
3 states that a civil action is commenced by the filing of a
complaint.126 In the context of an individual suit, claimants,
regardless of their membership in the class action suit previously
filed on their behalf, must file a new, separate complaint. As per
Rule 3 of the FRCP, a civil action is commenced by the filing of a
complaint, and as per Rule 2 of the FRCP, the only form of action
is a civil action.127 Therefore, by filing a separate complaint
pursuant to Section 11 or 12 of the 1933 Act more than three
years from the sale of a security, a claimant is attempting to
commence an action beyond the three-year limitation prescribed
by the statute of repose, conduct which is strictly prohibited by
the plain language of the provision.128
Rule 24 of the FRCP governs intervention and subsection (c)
states that “[a] motion to intervene . . . must state the grounds
for intervention and be accompanied by a pleading.”129 In turn,
Rule 7 lists the only pleadings that are permitted in federal
courts and includes only forms of complaints and answers to
complaints.130 So, per the FRCP, for class members to intervene
they must submit a pleading to the court, which can only be in
the form of a complaint if it is not an answer or reply to a
120

15 U.S.C. § 77m (2006) (emphasis added).
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 33 (9th ed. 2009).
122
See Goldenberg v. Murphy, 108 U.S. 162, 163 (1883).
123
What is Commence?, THE LAW DICTIONARY, http://www.thelawdictionary.org/
commence/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2013).
124
15 U.S.C. § 77m.
125
FED. R. CIV. P. 2.
126
Id. at 3.
127
Id. at 2, 3.
128
15 U.S.C. § 77m.
129
FED. R. CIV. P. 24(c) (emphasis added).
130
Id. at 7(a).
121
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previously filed complaint.131 A motion to intervene, however,
cannot possibly take form as an answer or reply to a prior
complaint.132 Thus, since a claimant seeking to intervene must
file a complaint and a complaint commences a civil action, a
claimant seeking to intervene more than three years from the
sale of the security upon which the class action is based is
effectively bringing an action and is acting in direct
contravention of the express language of the statute.
Instances where a court permits a plaintiff to submit an
“Amended Complaint” pose no further difficulty to this rationale.
Rule 15 of the FRCP governs amended and supplemental
pleadings.133 Federal courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction
should adhere to state rules governing the commencement of a
suit, while the FRCP governs the commencement of a suit where
federal courts face questions of federal law.134 As per Rule 15, an
amended complaint “commences” a new action if it does not
relate back to the original pleading.135
Courts that have confronted this issue have only paid
attention to Rule 23 of the FRCP, disregarding the other relevant
and applicable provisions found within the FRCP. Those who
believe that Section 13’s statute of repose does not prohibit
motions to intervene or individual suits after the three-year
period has run argue that, according to American Pipe, the filing
of a timely class action complaint effectively commences the
action for all members of the subsequently determined class and
therefore the obligation to bring an action within the three-year
period prescribed by the statute of repose is satisfied when the
class action is filed.136 This justification, however, disregards
relevant rules of civil procedure and ignores the statute’s text.

131

Id. at 24, 7(a).
Id. at 24.
133
Id. at 15.
134
See, e.g., Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 751–53 (1980); Larsen v.
Mayo Med. Ctr., 218 F.3d 863, 867 (8th Cir. 2000).
135
FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c).
136
See Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 550–53 (1974).
132
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Furthermore, the 1933 Act’s plain language cannot be
ignored so that remedial purposes can be served.137 Remedial
goals are necessarily considered in enacting the federal securities
laws138 and “it is proper for a court to consider . . . policy
considerations in construing terms in [the federal securities]
Acts.”139 Courts, however, cannot disregard the actual language
of a statute in its analysis.140 While the 1933 Act does provide
civil remedies for violations, the remedial goals of the Act are not
a proper basis for a broader interpretation of Section 13 than
that allowed for by its language.
Statutory analysis begins with the plain meaning of a law’s
text, and since the language “[i]n no event shall any such action
be brought”141 is unambiguous, the scrutiny should end there.142
Section 13’s plain language indicates Congress’s understanding
that statutes of repose operate differently from statutes of
limitations. The language of Section 13 of the 1933 Act is where
courts must primarily ascertain the scope of limitation Congress
intended by the statute of repose.143 When congressional intent
is clearly indicated by the text of the law in question, as it is in
Section 13, courts must effectuate that meaning.144 Congress
purposely inserted “[i]n no event shall any . . . action be brought
137
Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 653 (1988) (“The broad remedial goals of the
Securities Act are insufficient justification for interpreting a specific provision ‘more
broadly than its language and the statutory scheme reasonably permit.’ ” (quoting
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
138
Id. at 653 (citing Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967)) (“And the
Court has recognized that Congress had ‘broad remedial goals’ in enacting the
securities laws and providing civil remedies.” (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. 185, 200 (1976))).
139
Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471
U.S. 681, 694 n.7 (1985)).
140
Id.
141
15 U.S.C. § 77m (2006).
142
Dobrova v. Holder, 607 F.3d 297, 301 (2d Cir. 2010) (“ ‘[S]tatutory analysis
necessarily begins with the plain meaning of a law’s text and, absent ambiguity, will
generally end there.’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting Bustamante v. Napolitano,
582 F.3d 403, 406 (2d Cir. 2009))).
143
Pinter, 486 U.S. at 653 (citing Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462,
472 (1977)) (“The ascertainment of congressional intent with respect to the scope of
liability created by a particular section of the Securities Act must rest primarily on
the language of that section.”).
144
Id. (“ ‘The ultimate question is one of congressional intent, not one of
whether this Court thinks [that] it can improve upon the statutory scheme that
Congress enacted into law.’ ” (quoting Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560,
578 (1979))).
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to enforce a liability” for the statute of repose.145 Likewise,
Congress chose to draft the statute of limitations, just a sentence
prior, in a more subtle way, stating that “[n]o action shall be
maintained to enforce any liability.”146 The use of different words
in Section 13, specifically the more forceful language employed in
the statute of repose, eliminates the ambiguity and expresses the
intention that unlike the statute of limitations, the statute of
repose is to be an absolute bar.
Moreover, the primary tools of statutory analysis buttress
the interpretation that Section 13’s statute of repose is not
subject to the American Pipe doctrine. Every word of Section 13
is to be given effect.147 “In no event” would not be given its proper
effect if in this event an action was permitted after the
limitations period expires.148 Also, courts should not construe a
statute in a way that would cause the statutory language to be
superfluous.149 “Unless the ‘in no event more than three’
language cuts off claims of tolling and estoppel at three
years . . . it serves no purpose at all . . . .”150 Accordingly, to
interpret Section 13’s statute of repose not as an absolute bar
would contradict the statute’s very purpose, ignore its plain text,
and disregard the Supreme Court’s instruction on how to
properly analyze a statute.
Because the plain language of Section 13 expressly and
unambiguously forbids the exact conduct that is sought by those
wishing to benefit from the American Pipe doctrine, the statutory
analysis should come to an end. In the event that this logic is not
persuasive enough, other principles of statutory interpretation

145

15 U.S.C. § 77m.
Id.
147
Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 391 (2009) (quoting Reiter v. Sonotone
Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979)); accord Gottlieb v. Carnival Corp., 436 F.3d 335, 337
(2d Cir. 2006).
148
See 15 U.S.C. § 77m.
149
Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009) (“[A] statute should be
construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be
inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant . . . .” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
150
Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d 1385, 1391 (7th Cir. 1990); see
Caviness v. Derand Res. Corp., 983 F.2d 1295, 1301 (4th Cir. 1993) (concluding “an
interpretation that tolling principles should be applied to extend the three-year
period of § 13 would . . . ignore the plain meaning of the language . . . ‘in no
event’ . . . and defeat the very purpose of a statute of repose”).
146
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support the conclusion that the American Pipe doctrine does not
extend the period of time for which an individual claim or a
motion to intervene must be commenced beyond three years.
2.

Congress Intended Section 13’s Statute of Repose To Operate
as an Absolute Bar

Allowing someone to intervene or file an individual suit after
the uninterrupted repose period has run would undermine
congressional intent. The legislature’s purpose for enacting
Section 13’s statute of repose reveals its nature as an absolute
bar to claims brought after the date of repose. The key purpose
of a statute of repose is to provide a fixed and definite date for
the quieting of litigation.151 Like statutes of repose in other
contexts, Section 13’s statute of repose is “ ‘based on
considerations of the economic best interests of the public as a
whole’ ” and “ ‘a legislative balance of the respective rights of
potential plaintiffs and defendants struck by determining a time
limit beyond which liability no longer exists.’ ”152 Allowing
actions to be brought after the three-year repose period would
favor the rights of plaintiffs over those of defendants. It would
also run afoul of the certainty that Congress sought. It is
immaterial that some courts feel that the absolute bar may
induce parties to file protective claims and potentially cause the
needless multiplicity of suits that Rule 23 seeks to avoid because
Congress, in passing Section 13, has already weighed these
concerns and determined that to ensure stability of business,
such causes of action need be extinguished despite whatever
exigent circumstances or judicial inefficiencies may arise.
The legislative history of the Securities Act of 1933 also
supports the conclusion that American Pipe should not apply to
Section 13’s statute of repose.153 When the 1933 Act was first
enacted, Section 13 initially contained a one- to ten-year
structure within which the statute of limitations would be a oneyear period and the statute of repose would be a ten-year

151
P. Stolz Family P’ship L.P. v. Daum, 355 F.3d 92, 104 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding
that a statute of repose is meant to provide parties, investors, and the business
community with “an easily ascertainable and certain date for the quieting of
litigation”).
152
Webb v. United States, 66 F.3d 691, 701 (4th Cir. 1995) (quoting First United
Methodist Church v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 882 F.2d 862, 865–66 (4th Cir. 1989)).
153
See Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 558 & n.29 (1974).
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limitation.154 In 1934, in reaction to criticism, Congress reduced
the statute of repose to a three-year time limitation.155 The
lingering liability concern had the effect of disrupting business
dealings156 and the shorter repose period was intended to give
greater assurance to corporations.157 Also, the concern that too
long a window for a strict liability statute would discourage
individuals from serving on boards of directors for fear of liability
motivated this change.158 These qualms were met by the 1934
amendments and addressed by the shortening of the repose
period from ten to three years.159 If the statute of repose is not an
absolute bar, the legislature’s concern for ongoing lawsuits would
be blatantly ignored.
3.

The SEC’s Interpretation That Section 13’s Statute of Repose
Is Absolute Should Carry Import

Moreover, courts should defer to the Securities and
Exchange Commission’s (“SEC”) interpretation of Section 13’s
statute of repose because of the SEC’s conferred power and
expertise in dealing with the Act. Courts addressing the issue
have not made much reference to the SEC’s perspective on the
matter despite the SEC’s authority to interpret the securities
laws.160
It is imperative that courts defer to the SEC’s interpretation
of Section 13’s statute of repose. In Skidmore v. Swift & Co., the
Supreme Court had to interpret the Fair Labor Standards Act
(“FLSA”) to determine what constituted “hours worked, for which
154

See Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, Pub. L. No. 73-22, § 13, 48 Stat. 74, 84

(1933).
155
78 CONG. REC. 8668 (1934) (responding to “criticisms and complaints which
have come to the committee that the present act is too drastic, and is interfering
with business,” Congress reduced the fixed repose period to three years in 1934)
(remarks of Sen. Fletcher).
156
Id.
157
Id. at 10,186.
158
Brief for the SEC as Amicus Curiae, Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis &
Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991) (No. 90-333), 1990 WL 10012716, at
*28–29 (quoting 78 CONG. REC. 8200 (1934) (remarks of Sen. Byrnes)) (expressing
that an extended window would “ ‘deter [individuals] from serving on boards of
directors’ because of fear of lingering liabilities” (alteration in original)).
159
See Norris v. Wirtz, 818 F.2d 1329, 1332 (7th Cir. 1987) (“The legislative
history in 1934 makes it pellucid that Congress included statutes of repose because
of fear[s] that lingering liabilities would disrupt normal business and facilitate false
claims. It was understood that the three-year rule was to be absolute.”).
160
15 U.S.C. § 78d-1(a) (2006).
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overtime compensation [was] due.”161 The Court explained that
Congress created the office of Administrator and imposed
responsibilities upon it with respect to enforcement of the
FLSA.162
Pursuant to its duties, the Administrator “has
accumulated a considerable experience in the problems of
ascertaining working time in employments.”163 In its Brief
Amicus Curiae, the Administrator asserted that proper
interpretation of the statute excluded sleeping and eating time of
employees from the workweek and included all other on-call
time.164 In drawing its conclusion, the Court stated that while
“[t]here is no statutory provision as to what, if any, deference
courts should pay to the Administrator’s conclusions[,] . . . [t]his
Court has long given considerable and in some cases decisive
weight to . . . other bodies that were not of adversary origin.”165
The Court went on to explain that although the Administrator’s
rulings, interpretations, and opinions are not controlling, they do
represent experience and informed judgment to which courts
appropriately may resort to for guidance.166 However, “[t]he
weight of such a judgment in a particular case will depend upon
the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements,
and all those factors which give it power to persuade.”167
More recently in United States v. Mead Corp., the Supreme
Court affirmed and expanded upon the policy prescribed in
Skidmore.168 In Mead, the issue was whether a three-ring binder
with pages for daily schedules, phone numbers and addresses, a
calendar, and so forth was a “diary” under the Harmonized Tariff
Schedule of the United States.169 Congress charged the United
States Customs Service with classifying and fixing rates of
imports.170 The Court had to determine what weight to give a

161

Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 136 (1944).
Id. at 137.
163
Id.
164
Id. at 139.
165
Id. at 139–40. “The fact that the Administrator’s policies and standards are
not reached by trial in adversary form does not mean that they are not entitled to
respect.” Id. at 140.
166
Id.
167
Id.
168
See generally United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
169
Id. at 218.
170
Id. at 221–22.
162
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Customs ruling letter in making its decision.171 The Court
acknowledged that “it can still be apparent from the agency’s
generally conferred authority and other statutory circumstances
that Congress would expect the agency to be able to speak with
the force of law when it addresses ambiguity in [a] statute.”172
The Court emphasized that an agency’s interpretation, in
whatever form it may appear, “may merit some
deference . . . given the ‘specialized experience and broader
investigations and information’ available to the agency, and
given the value of uniformity in its administrative and judicial
understandings of what a national law requires.”173 Ultimately,
the Court afforded deference to the interpretation proffered by
the Customs Service proportional to its “power to persuade.”174
Accordingly, deference should be given to the SEC’s
description of Section 13’s statute of repose. In an amicus brief,
the SEC confirmed that Section 13’s statute of repose bars all
actions brought more than three years from the bona fide offering
or sale of a security. Congress created the SEC to enforce the
securities laws, promote stability in the markets, protect
investors, and granted the SEC broad authority to carry out its
obligations.175
Specifically, one of the SEC’s primary
responsibilities is to interpret the federal securities laws.176 In a
brief submitted by the SEC as amicus curiae, the SEC explained
that the three-year repose period reflects a congressional policy
against allowing actions to be brought after the repose period has
run so that potential defendants will not be subject to liabilities
for indefinite periods.177
The SEC further explained that
Congress established the relatively short periods for express

171

See id. at 226.
Id. at 229.
173
Id. at 234 (citation omitted) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134,
139–40 (1944)); see Metro. Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 521 U.S. 121, 136 (1997) (finding
that reasonable agency interpretations carry “at least some added persuasive force”
where Chevron is inapplicable).
174
Mead, 533 U.S. at 235 (quoting Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140).
175
See 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010); id. § 78d-1(a) (2006); SEC,
supra note 31.
176
See SEC, supra note 31.
177
Brief for the SEC as Amicus Curiae, supra note 158 (“[T]he outside period of
repose in the 1933 and 1934 Act periods reflects a general congressional policy
against tolling of securities claims . . . . This policy stems from the view that, if
tolling is available, potential defendants will be subject to contingent liabilities for
indefinite periods.”).
172
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rights, such as those found in Sections 11 and 12 of the 1933 Act,
because they are strict liability provisions.178 Given the SEC’s
expertise enforcing the federal securities laws, its reasoned logic
for interpreting the statute as it did, the consistency of the SEC’s
interpretation with the legislative intent for enacting the statute
of repose, and the thoroughness of the opinion set forth in its
Amicus Brief, the SEC’s interpretation should be given deference
by courts. 179 This deference, combined with the unambiguous
statutory language and intent, should foreclose any finding that
Section 13’s statute of repose is subject to the American Pipe
doctrine.
4.

The Benefits of Section 13 Barring Actions After the Date of
Repose Outweigh the Costs

The interpretation of Section 13’s statute of repose as an
absolute bar to actions brought after expiration of the
uninterrupted three-year repose period results in the most
efficient use of judicial resources. To allow investors with large
individual claims to take a wait-and-see approach with respect to
the class action without having to decide whether to opt out or
join the class would significantly hinder settlement
negotiations.180 Furthermore, the uncertainty with respect to
class size and number of opt-outs will make it difficult for parties
to effectively negotiate settlements.181 Also, the likelihood of a
settlement, which promotes greater judicial economy by resolving
disputes outside of the courtroom, is increased by requiring early
decisions to be made by unnamed class members.
Moreover, forcing plaintiffs to decide whether to have their
rights represented by the class action or to file individual claims
before expiration of the statute of repose period best serves the
interests of judicial economy and efficiency. Whether or not more
suits are filed for protective purposes, these suits will be decided
much earlier than if the American Pipe doctrine allowed actions
to be brought long after the repose period extinguished.

178

Id.
See id. at 28–30.
180
Brief for Defendant-Appellee Stanford L. Kurland at 18–19, Footbridge Ltd.
Trust v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., No. 11-1158 (2d Cir. Sept. 28, 2011), 2011 WL
4735347.
181
Id. at 19.
179
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The inefficiencies caused by not allowing actions to be
brought after the three-year repose period are overshadowed by
the inefficiencies that would result if American Pipe did modify
Section 13’s statute of repose. While it is acknowledged that
applying Section 13 as an absolute bar may result in a
multiplicity of lawsuits being filed as protective measures, this
concern, in practicality, is overstated for three reasons.
First, protective actions will be filed by unnamed class
members in only limited circumstances. Protective actions will
be filed only when claims are subject to a statute of repose and
the class certification motion has not yet been decided as the
repose limitation period draws near.182
In addition, those
choosing to file their own protective claims would have to be
aware of their rights and have enough of an individual interest to
motivate them to pursue a claim on their own. As discussed,
most individual investors have only minimal damages and it
would not prove cost-effective to bring an individual claim.
Second, plaintiffs, in conjunction with their lawyers, govern
the nature of the suit they wish to bring.183 The Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure demand that class certification be determined at
“an early practicable time” after the commencement of an
action.184 In essence, plaintiffs control the timing at which class
certification is determined, based on the adequacy of their claim
of being a class. Therefore, it is in the plaintiff’s control whether
or not the three-year repose period becomes a concern.
Third, the inefficiency feared by plaintiffs having to file
protective suits can be mitigated by procedures already
commonly used to manage class actions.185 Opt-out actions can
be consolidated for pretrial proceedings by the U.S. Judicial
Panel for Multidistrict Litigation,186 and motions to intervene, at
the court’s discretion, can be deferred pending class certification
decisions.187

182
183
184
185
186
187

Id. at 16–17.
Id. at 17; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(A).
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(A).
Brief for Defendant-Appellee Stanford L. Kurland, supra note 180, at 17.
Id. at 18; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2006).
Brief for Defendant-Appellee Stanford L. Kurland, supra note 180, at 18.
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CONCLUSION
This Note reveals that the American Pipe doctrine,
regardless of whether it is declared a tolling doctrine or not,
cannot be applied to Section 13’s statute of repose so as to permit
claimants to bring individual claims or motions to intervene after
the repose period has run. The statute as written operates as an
absolute bar to any action brought after the uninterrupted threeyear repose period extinguishes and is not subject to any doctrine
that modifies its limitation period. The statute’s plain language,
its legislative intent, the SEC’s interpretation of the statutory
text, and the policy interest of finality in the business arena, all
point toward this conclusion. It is understood that Congress can
legislate in order to permit the conduct that the statute of repose
presently prohibits. In the absence of legislative action, however,
Section 13 of the 1933 Act must be given its absolute and
uninhibited effect.

